6th Battlefield
The subject of changing approaches to information security was not brought up by the establishment of the Ministry of Information Policy, but emerged as an organic response to threats. In the mid December 2013, a heated phase of open confrontation began in the information space when the main Russian television channels openly incited hatred of everything Ukrainian.
In 2014, when the Russian Federation began the acute stage of aggression, the Information and Analysis Centre under the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine started its operation. It consisted of several individuals whose task was to form an information agenda on the progress of the anti-terrorist operation.
Representatives of about 15 institutions used to meet daily in one room in the morning and to discuss messages that were to be given that day on the anti-terrorist operation. This practice, allowing to synchronize positions, was quite effective. For example, border guards discussed with security officials and the State Emergency Service how to present a question to the media. For example, the crossing of the confrontation line — how refugees can move from the conflict zone in the Lugansk and Donetsk region to a safe area under the control of the Ukrainian government.
When the discussion of policy documents (for example, the Doctrine of Information Security) began after the signing of the Coalition Agreement, it became clear that the national security sector could not functionally perform tasks to give us an advantage in the information space.
For the predominance in the infosphere, the content that every Ukrainian citizen consumes must be pro-Ukrainian on more than a half. A person turns on the television, watches two hours of news or other programmes. Our task is to ensure that, during this time, 60–70% of the content has the pro-Ukrainian character. Then, according to the so-called Thomas Theorem, the concept of the information bubble, and many other laws of psychology and sociology, the information consumers shape the pro-Ukrainian reality around them. This is the information aspect of the national security of the State.
However, it’s impossible to imagine that the Security Service of Ukraine, the NSDC, the Ministry of Defence or any other state organ could create or promote necessary media product. However, one of the functions of the information policy is to express the position of the State and the authorized bodies, forming the infospace through messages understandable and accessible to citizens. This is a constructive function, which is not in power of the national security sector since the main instruments of the latter are enforcement, bans, sanctions, etc.
This understanding of functions and tasks formed the basis for the establishment of the Ministry of Information Policy. There’s an information security function, but it’s not exercised only by the security organs. The security sector cannot implement the concept of resilience because, roughly speaking, its task is to be walls and towers with machine guns. It is necessary to protect the state, but not in the information space.
Such a vision underlies the evolution of the information security function into the information policy.
Information Security Concept
In classical theory, security is protection from harm. In the Western community, “information security” is understood in a way that is quite different from that in Ukraine and is associated with cyber security. For example, the new Military Doctrine of the Pentagon introduced the term “Fifth Battlefield” with regard to cyberspace. The first four dimensions are land, sea, air and space. Of course, “cybersecurity” is an integral part of this sphere. However, Ukrainian experience showed that the truly terrible threats to national security are rumours, flyers, printed pseudo press created at the expense of the aggressor and then distributed massively and free of charge to the public. Cyberspace has almost nothing to do with such methods. Thus, we speak more of the “Sixth Battlefield”, which is the consciousness of human beings, their critical attitude towards the media, information and psycho-emotional environment.
This is an important distinction between the Ukrainian and Western concepts. For the information space in which Ukrainian citizens exist, security is a state characterized by invulnerability to harmful messages spread and promoted by the enemy. An analogy can be drawn with the operating system of a computer, constantly updating, protected with anti-virus and containing no vulnerabilities for intruders. The more attention and resources are devoted to “prevention”, maintenance and administration of a computer, the less likely it is to be infected with a malicious virus.
Such an understanding of the information security is outlined in the policy document, the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine. In the first place, security is not the prohibition or blocking of content, but the creation of the “Ukrainian brand” catering for the citizens through presenting the desired picture of the present and the future. There’s a perfectly simple explanation for this.
A person lives in an information bubble, receiving a limited amount of information in a certain amount of time. In this information bubble, the pro-Ukrainian position must prevail. What is the pro-Ukrainian position? It is not a legal term which can be defined from legal consideration but is pretty easy to trace in the media sphere.
For example, the debate on the federalization of Ukraine does not have any evidence of a wrongdoing. Anyone can take up the issue and exercise their freedom of expression in this way. But in the current situation in Ukraine, this issue poses a threat to national security inciting separatist sentiments, facilitating the Russian side to influence the regions and the pro-Russian forces to take an overriding position in information space. The issue of federalization is therefore toxic to Ukrainian citizens.
It is impossible to prohibit discussion of a federal structure because there is no legal ground. But it can be openly stated that this issue is a threat to national security.
Information Threats
In the theory of national security, the threat is a set of aspects that affect the operational environment and impede the achievement of the strategic objectives set for the state. For example, the conditional model of the future of Ukraine could be expressed in numerous ways, particularly in the need for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This position is shared by the political parties supported by the people; by the President elected by Ukrainian citizens as head of State; by representatives of the Government of Ukraine appointed by the Parliament. So, this is a democratically created model of our desired future.
The Russian thesis is that Ukraine should join the Eurasian Customs Union not seeking integration with the EU, because West is decaying and governed by homosexuals and paedophiles. Such a narrative is intended to discredit state policy and constitutes a threat to the strategic decision of Ukraine adopted in conformity with all the principles of a democratic and independent society.
The issue of threats to national interests has many nuances. Firstly, it’s not always possible to have a legal ground for such an approach to information security. The assertion that all threats should be legislated first and only then fought against indicates a lack of understanding of the theory and practice of information and hybrid warfare. It is impossible to argue the existence of each threat from a legal point of view in order to transfer the functions of countering them to security organs and law enforcement agencies.
Secondly, the perception of threats is of an empirical nature. Civil society, for example, formulates its own thesis leading, in its view, to the desired ideal future. Among other things, in the information space of Ukraine, news that “the country is not changing because of the slow pace of reform and corruption, and all the achievements of the Revolution of Dignity are noughted and forgotten” is disseminated.
Of course, it is impossible to prohibit members of the public from making such statements, since pluralism is a gauge of democracy. It is a big mistake to reckon these people among the Kremlin agents by default. It is such heated discussions that make us distinct from the “Kremlin feudal system”.
In some cases, however, the massive dissemination of such message and its strong resource support from foreign donors (not excluding even Russian) also poses a threat to the successful implementation of Ukraine’s information policy, since sometimes it has the same connotation as the Russian narratives.
That is why the definition of threats is often of an empirical and political nature that cannot be given legal explanation. The Russian side exploits sensitivity of the matter very often, so Ukraine will have to live in this coordinate system for a long time.
Information Security Doctrine of Ukraine
Against this background, the Information Security Doctrine of Ukraine became to a greater extent a visionary document containing no rules of direct action. Although some provisions are not ideal due to an inclusive process of drafting, the document in general is well designed. Civic activists and non-state experts, representatives of the security sector and specialists in the commercial segment of the communications industry participated in its drawing up.
It should be noted that the security forces understand the world in the manner that corresponds to their objectives. Roughly speaking, if a person has a hammer, everything around him or her is a nail. The main function of security and law enforcement agencies is protection. Our challenge in drafting the doctrine was to make the document proactive rather than build a wall out of prohibitions.
For example, the implementation mechanism of the instrument provides that the Ministry of Information Policy, as an actor within the information security management system, should establish and coordinate a system of strategic communications within central government bodies. The task is both complex and simple. But we lack documents, procedures, instructions and regulations that fulfil this task.
The Doctrine also prescribes one debatable function: monitoring and removing information contradicting the law from the information space of Ukraine. Although in accordance with article 11 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, in practice this right is limited.
International law and Ukrainian legislation prohibit to disseminate incitements of hatred, racial and religious intolerance, as well as calls for the forcible constitutional order change and territorial integrity violation. Some governing regimes use these rules to create leverages over society. In the absence of such provisions, however, it would not be possible to speak of the state independence. That is why freedom of speech is not unlimited.
How Decisions Are Made
Often, circumstances and events do not allow information policy implementation to follow the traditional management processes. While it is not yet possible to talk about the consistency, law-making process is as inclusive as it is. The Public and Expert Councils under MIP is invited to discuss legislative initiatives. The thesis that the Ministry intends to promote as a component of public policy is submitted only after discussion and synchronization with all stakeholders.
The same principles guide the coordination with other agencies. In the information field, horizontal management tools are of great need. The harmonization of positions with law enforcement and security agencies monitoring and countering information operations against Ukraine is worth mentioning as an example.
In the Ministry of Information Policy, the approach to infosecurity initiatives is not trivial. For example, in narrow expert areas, decisions are made by those who are most aware of the situation, including advisers representing an expert position on the StratCom system formation. In more important and strategic directions, it is the Minister who makes the decision. In addition, the regular synchronization of different views and considerations, which is achieved through regular meetings, is of significant importance.
How Long Does It Take To Make Decisions
In 2015–2016, the speed of response by government authorities to crises was blue. Unfortunately, in the vertically integrated management processes of the public authorities, the communication and information response to the crises appeared within 6–8 working hours, which, of course, was unsatisfactory.
On 27 June 2017, a large-scale cyberattack on government institutions was committed. Some bodies had not made official statements at all for the first 24 hours. In the context of horizontal management, it is possible to respond to this situation within 2.5–3 hours (ideally 60–70 minutes).
Imperfect Solution
Crisis situations require an immediate response, for which there is no institutional mechanism. The live coverage on the popular TV channel is impossible to arrange by a telephone call, while the organization of a briefing or press conference requires too much time, in comparison to the speed of information dissemination. Therefore, alternative solutions have to be resorted to.
For example, by using personal contacts with colleagues in other institutions, I am trying to obtain various expert opinions. Then, using my Facebook profile, I try to state my position. It is imperfect solution, because the position of the state must be stated through a formal process, not by a post in the social network, usually having a negative feedback.
But the era of social media, unfortunately, has the upper hand, so you have to use your own social network page to express your position, knowing that the media will use this information. It is worth trying to convey your point of view in an informal way, as a message for a friend, not in a dry official language. Although this broken scheme does not reflect the official position of the Ministry or the State, in my case it works ensuring speedy resolution of the issue.
One aspect of the intelligence theory, largely underlying a hybrid war, suggests that uncertainty is the main enemy of the person making the decisions. Any steps taken by the enemy or the deterioration of the operational situation have no such devastating impact on your strategy as uncertainty, not only impeding the implementation of plans, but also having a destructive psychological impact.
Communication at the state level is just the instrument aimed at combating uncertainty. Especially when the issue of uncertainty concerns large audiences. However, it must be recognized that the state of uncertainty is gradually becoming a “new normal” for our world.
It was the hybrid war that led to such a change and it would be naïve to expect that someday we would return to the previous state. To find out how to face uncertainties, read my previous article.
